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1. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty in the policy making process creates substantial transaction costs
for ﬁrms (Williamson, 1991; Henisz andZelner, 2004). Consequently, business
organisations engage in political behaviour to internalise these costs and
inﬂuence the policy process in ways favourable to them. The current paper is
concerned with a particular form of political strategy adopted by ﬁrms in
China. A signiﬁcant number of private-owned enterprises adopt the so-called
‘‘red hat’’ strategy by seeking political aﬃliation with the Communist Party
andvariousgovernmental entities. Somescholars see this strategyasameansof
circumventing problems associated with the lack of secure property rights and
institutional discrimination, such as the lending bias of China’s state-domi-
natedbanking systemagainst indigenous entrepreneurs (Li et al., 1999;Huang,
2003), heavy government regulations and extralegal fees (Johnson et al., 2000;
Guriev, 2004). This view is consistent with the ‘‘helping hand’’ theory of
government-business relationship (Che andQian, 1998).However, theory also
predicts that government bureaucrats tend to be more interested in rent-
seeking, extraction and political objectives rather than corporate eﬃciency and
maximising ﬁrm value (e.g. Shleifer andVishny, 1998; Rosa and Pe´rard, 2010).
Given that politics and business have always been interrelated, it is perhaps
surprising to observe that there is a paucity of work analysing the corporate
performance implications of political connections. The few studies in this area
include Fisman’s (2001) estimation of the value of political aﬃliations to ﬁrms
in Indonesia and the analysis of Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) on the
ﬁnancing strategy of politically connected Indonesian ﬁrms. For Malaysia,
Johnson and Mitton (2003) uncover a strong positive correlation between
stock market performance and political connections in Malaysia in the
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presence of capital controls. Using a survey of 3259 private enterprises in
China, Li et al. (2008) ﬁnd that Communist Party membership of private
entrepreneurs is important to ﬁrm proﬁtability, especially in regions with
weaker market institutions.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to contribute to this sparse literature
by evaluating the eﬀects of political connections on the survival and growth
prospects of newly formed private enterprises in China. Political connection is
deﬁned through three categorical variables indicating whether these private
enterprises are formally aﬃliated with local, middle level (prefecture and town
level) orhigh level (regional and central) government agencies,whose functions
include oﬀering credit guarantees and political protection in return for
‘‘management fees’’ (Huang, 2003). Our study is based on more than
106,000 private ﬁrms that entered the market between 1999 and 2004, 23%
of which are politically aﬃliated in the sense deﬁned above. Some papers (e.g.
Li et al. 2008) use managers’ party membership as an indicator of political
connection. However, such studies tend to rely on small sample sizes and
therefore have limited scope.
We argue that China is a particularly interesting country for studies of the
relationship between political connections andﬁrmperformance.First, in spite
of a centralised political system,China’s process of economic liberalisation has
been highly decentralised, with various levels of governments having autono-
mous policymaking powers within their jurisdictions. Thus the case of China
oﬀers useful variation in the type of political connections that can be exploited
to identify the relationship of interest. Second,China’sWorldTradeOrganisa-
tion (WTO) accession stipulates several compulsory provisions on government
relationships, including the absence of discriminatory economic policy. In this
respect, it is important to determine the extent to which political cronyism is
distorting market mechanisms. If the business environment in the country is
not providing a level playing ﬁeld for all market participants, it is not only
politically unaﬃliated domestic ﬁrms that would be discriminated against.
Firms in China’s trading partner countries would also face unfair competition
in light of China’s ever-deeper integration into the world economy. Thus, a
study of the business-politics nexus inChina haswider implications beyond the
narrowconﬁnes of the domestic political economy sphere.Third, anadvantage
of using Chinese data is that one need not be concerned with endogenous
matching between ﬁrms and political parties (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002)
since there is only one political party. Furthermore the focus on newly formed
private enterprises with a given level of political connection helps us abstract
from the issue of possible reverse causality in which a ﬁrm decides on its
political aﬃliation based on its past growth performance.
Our econometric analysis yields ﬁve major conclusions: (i) political connec-
tions signiﬁcantly enhance ﬁrms’ survival prospects; (ii) conditional on survival,
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employment growth is faster for politically aﬃliated ﬁrms; (iii) conditional on
survival, politically unaﬃliated private ﬁrms perform better in terms of
productivity growth; (iv) the beneﬁts due to political connections are largely
conﬁnedtoﬁrmsassociatedwith local andhigh levels ofgovernment; and (v) the
eﬀects of political connections are more pronounced in capital intensive
industries where ﬁrms require a wider range of resources for their growth,
and the ‘‘helping hand’’ of government is presumably needed more.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution
of private ﬁrms-government relationship in China. Section 3 presents the
empirical model, and Section 4 describes the data set used in the analysis. The
mainﬁndingsof thepaperarediscussed inSection5.Finally,Section6concludes.
2. PRIVATE FIRMS AND THE BODY POLITIC IN CHINA
Theprivate sector accounts for 60%of thevalue-added generated inChinaand
employs close to 200 million people1. As a result, the sector’s contribution to
the prosperity of the country is praised by the political hierarchy, and private
entrepreneurs are courted by the Chinese Communist Party (Guiheux, 2006).
The country has indeed come a long way from the time of the Cultural
Revolution when entrepreneurs were prosecuted as ‘‘tails of capitalism’’
(Young, 1989).
However, in spite of improving legal protection for private ﬁrms, market-
supporting institutions are still weak in China and private entrepreneurs suﬀer
from political and institutional discrimination. Li et al. (2006) documents
evidence that private entrepreneurs’ response to market and institutional
failures is to engage in political behaviour—the strategy of ‘‘wearing a red
hat’’. The motivation for joining the political hierarchy is easier access to
resources such as land and bank credit, information on regulations and new
policies, and protection from competition.
A study conducted in 2002 revealed that 80 percent of the entrepreneurs
surveyed had become members of the party before starting a business
(Guiheux, 2006). Other ways entrepreneurs can participate in politics include:
serving as delegates in local or national People’s Congresses, contesting
elections for local administration posts and joining business associations that
link the state and the private sector (Guiheux, 2006).
Yet another way in which ﬁrms engage in political behaviour is aﬃliation
with some level of government administration. A large number of private
enterprises in China have political connections with governmental bodies
whose functions include oﬀering credit guarantees and political protection in
1. Source: OECD Economic Surveys: China (2005).
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return for ‘‘management fees’’ (Huang, 2003). Broadly speaking, ﬁrms can be
politically aﬃliated with ﬁve diﬀerent levels of governments (e.g. Li, 2004).
These are (in decreasing order of hierarchy): central, provincial, prefecture,
county and township (local) governments. The relationship between
diﬀerent levels of government has been shaped by the revenue sharing system
(ﬁscal federalism). The system requires lower level governments to hand
over a ﬁxed amount of their revenue to the higher tier of government. Since
township governments have no lower level governments from which to
extract revenue, their main sources of income are the ﬁrms under their
jurisdiction. Thus, it is expected that local governments have more incentive
to support productive non-state enterprises. As Qian (2003) and Li (2004)
observe, ﬁscal federalism has aligned the interests of local governments with
local business, implying that it might pay oﬀ for private ﬁrms to be aﬃliated
with their local governments. However, it is also reasonable to suppose that
ﬁrms associated with higher levels of government (i.e. central and provincial)
are likely to enjoy better protection andmore privileges such as easier access to
export and import licences, favourable bank loans and lucrative public
contracts.
There are those who fear that the alliance between business and the body
politic is likely to foster rent seeking among entrepreneurs and cadres, reducing
the competitiveness of the market. Also as Dickson (2003) argues, ‘‘red
capitalists’’ have little incentive for structural changes that favour the private
sectoras awhole.This view is consistentwith themore general observation that
progress in large-scale economic liberalisation is constrained by the relative
power of political decision-makers and national interest groups (Opper, 2004).
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy to identify the eﬀects of
political behaviour on the post-entry performance of private ﬁrms in China.
We estimate a nonlinear model of the probability of ﬁrm exit and two linear
models of employment and total factor productivity growth.
Modelling the impact of political behaviour on ﬁrm survival
We model the probability of ﬁrm exit using a hazard rate speciﬁcation. The
hazard or the probability of exit for ﬁrm i in period t, conditional on having
survived up to that point can be expressed as
hiðtjX;PÞ ¼ h0ðtÞ exp b0Xit1 þ g0Pit1 þ dDð Þ ð1Þ
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where hoðtÞ is the baseline hazard.With hazard functions one tries tomodel the
probability of ﬁrm failure in a given interval (i.e. between t-1 and t) conditional
upon the ﬁrm having survived to the beginning of the interval. We choose a
ﬂexible speciﬁcation for the baseline hazard and employ the Cox proportional
hazardmodel, which imposes a proportional characteristic-speciﬁc shift on the
baseline hazard.
In the above equation, P is a vector of 3 binary variables indicating the
government level (high, middle and local) the ﬁrm is aﬃliated with. Start-ups
without political connection are the base group.D is a set of time, sectoral and
regional dummies and X is a vector of control variables. In line with the
empirical literature (see Geroski, 1995) we include ﬁrm size (measured by
employment), age and productivity as control variables. It appears to be a
stylised fact that larger, older and more eﬃcient ﬁrms have better survival
prospects than smaller, younger and ineﬃcient ones. We also hypothesise that
ﬁrms that are export-oriented, enjoy access to ﬁnance and are engaged in
innovative activity, have lower likelihood of market exit. The vector X also
includes three industry level variables, namely industry exit and entry rates and
industry concentration. In all cases, lagged values of the covariates are used to
mitigate concerns about endogeneity. Table 1 gives the precise deﬁnition of the
variables used in the econometric analysis.
Another source of concern in the estimation of hazard models is the issue
of unobserved heterogeneity. As shown by Lancaster (1990), unobserved
Table 1
Deﬁnition of Key Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Size Log of total number of employees
Firm growth Year on year growth rate of total employment.
Total factor
productivity
(TFP)
Total factor productivity (TFP) estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin,
(2003) approach.
TFP growth Year on year growth rate of total factor productivity growth.
Age Years since birth
Export Share of export sales in total sales
Innovation Share of output involving new product and process divided by total output.
Finance Domestic bank loans divided by total asset.
Industry concentration Three-digit level Herﬁndhal index of concentration.
Industry entry Numberofnewentrants in industry asaproportionof total ﬁrms in industry.
Industry exit Number of exiting ﬁrms as a proportion of total ﬁrms in industry.
High level political
aﬃliation
Dummy for entrants that are politically aﬃliated with central or regional
governments: (total number5 1,053).
Middle level political
aﬃliation
Dummy for entrants that are politically aﬃliated with middle level
governments, i.e. prefecture and towns: (total number5 8,983).
Local level political
aﬃliation
A dummy variable for private ﬁrms politically aﬃliated with local
governments: (total number5 12696).
No political aﬃliation Private ﬁrms with no political aﬃliation: (total number5 83,986).
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heterogeneity, if neglected, would bias the proportionate response of the
hazard to variation in each regressor. For this reason, we estimate the hazard
model with unobserved heterogeneity that follows a gamma distribution2.
The impact of political aﬃliation on ﬁrm and productivity growth
In order to isolate the impact of political aﬃliationonﬁrmgrowth,we estimate
the following model:
Yit ¼ b0Zit1 þ g0Pit1 þ dDit þ fi þ eit ð2Þ
The dependent variable Y denotes either employment or total factor
productivity growth which is estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003)’s approach; P and D are deﬁned as in Equation (1), Z is a vector of
covariates hypothesised to impact on ﬁrm growth, f is a term capturing ﬁrm-
speciﬁc heterogeneity and e is a random error term. In the above model, Z
consists of exporting intensity, innovation intensity, and age, access to ﬁnance,
initial size / productivity and industry concentration.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that ﬁnds ﬁrm (productivity)
growth has a negative relationship with initial size (productivity), suggesting
convergence in ﬁrm size (e.g. Geroski, 1995). The positive correlation between
performance and exporting has been widely documented across a number of
countries, including China (Kraay, 1999). The growth enhancing eﬀects of
innovation and labour quality have also been recognised in the literature (Gort
et al., 1993 and Jovanovic, 1982). By contrast, increased competition is widely
believed to have a positive impact on ﬁrmperformance (e.g.Gonza´lez-Pa´ramo
and De Cos, 2005). On the other hand, the ﬁnance-growth nexus is well
researched in the economic literature (Levine, 2005, andDuandGirma, 2007).
Some theoretical models predict that ﬁrms with debt contracts tend to grow
faster than otherwise similar ﬁrms (e.g. Aghion et al., 1999). In these models,
debt ishypothesised to reduce theamountof free cash tomanagers, giving them
the incentive to reduce managerial slack and seek innovative ways to boost
eﬃciency.
We employ a generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator that
explicitly controls for the potential endogeneity of political connections. To
this end, we made an exploratory analysis on the determinants of political
connections3. The results suggest that politically aﬃliated ﬁrms tend to be
larger at birth, have higher initial productivity and enjoy greater access to
ﬁnance. Furthermore ﬁrms in a region with greater ﬁnancial development and
2. This is the equivalent to the inclusion of ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects in linear panel data models.
3. The results are available upon request from the authors.
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competition, larger presence of lawyers and intellectual property rights are less
likely to engage in political behaviour. At the industry level, the share of the
private sector has a negative relationship with the propensity of start-ups to
join the political bandwagon. We employ these regional and industry char-
acteristics as exogenous instruments for thepolitical connectionvariables in the
GMM estimations and ascertain their validity using the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions.
4. DATABASE DESCRIPTION
Our econometric analysis draws on theAnnualReport of Industrial Enterprise
Statistics compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSB).
The report covers the population of state-owned enterprises and all non-state
ﬁrms with an annual turnover of over ﬁve million Renminbi (just above
$600,000). It is estimated that the ﬁrms contained in the data set account for
about 85–90% of total output in most industries. The NSB performs several
logic tests to ensure the accuracy of the information in the report and identify
illogical data.
The data set includes information on ﬁrm ownership structure, industry
aﬃliation, geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output,
product innovation, R&D, value-added, net ﬁxed assets, exports, R&D and
employee training expenditures.4 The data set available to us spans the period
1999 to 2005, and comprisesmore than 1.3million ﬁrm-year observations. It is
worth noting that we used the whole sample to construct industry-level
variables (e.g. industry entry and exit rates). However, in view of the objective
of this paper, the econometric work is conﬁned to the new private domestic-
owned enterprises that entered the market.
The NSB assigns to each ﬁrm in the database a categorical variable
indicating ownership status. Nevertheless, it is also possible to construct a
continuousmeasureofownership composition fromthedatabaseby lookingat
the fraction of paid-in capital contributed by state, private and foreign
investors. Using this measure of ownership, we deﬁne a ﬁrm as being private
if private individuals are majority investors in the ﬁrm and it has used neither
central government nor foreign capital at its establishment.
A ﬁrm is deﬁned to be a new entrant at time t if its establishment year is given
as time t and it is observed in the database for the ﬁrst time at time t. This tight
deﬁnition of entry year helps avoid measurement error problems in the
establishment year variable. A nice feature of the database is that it maintains
a unique enterprise identiﬁer irrespective of the dynamics of ownership change.
4. Nominal values are deﬂated using industry-speciﬁc ex-factory price indices obtained from China
Statistical Yearbook 2006.
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This feature is useful when it comes to distinguishing private ﬁrms that are
liquidated (i.e. exited the market) and those that have experienced ownership
change (e.g. acquired by foreign investors). A ﬁrm is designated to have exited
the market at time t11 if it is observed at the time t or earlier, but not in
subsequent periods.
We identiﬁed 106,718 private ﬁrms who entered the market over the period
1999–20045 that have the necessary information for econometric estimation.
Some quarter of a million observations on these ﬁrms provide the basis of our
analysis. Table 2 reports summary statistics of some variables of interest by
political aﬃliation of ﬁrms. About 23% of new entrants are politically
aﬃliated, and more than half of these are associated with local governments.
Table 2 shows politically aﬃliated ﬁrms are generally bigger, grow at a faster
rate but exhibit slower productivity growth compared to their politically
unaﬃliated counterparts. Perhaps not surprisingly, the former group of ﬁrms
also enjoy greater access to ﬁnance.
5. DISCUSSION OF THEMAIN FINDINGS
Does political aﬃliation aﬀect ﬁrms’ survival probability?
Inspection of the raw data reveals that politically aﬃliated ﬁrms have a
higher survival chance compared to their unaﬃliated counterparts. To be
Table 2
Summary Statistics of Some Variables of Interest by Political Aﬃliations of Firms
Level of political aﬃliation
High Middle Local None
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Growth 0.071 0.508 0.018 0.491 0.084 0.517 0.029 0.486
TFP growth 0.013 0.639 0.027 0.694 0.014 0.639 0.053 0.590
Size 5.031 1.453 4.812 1.080 4.390 0.950 4.351 0.923
Age 2.362 1.544 2.206 1.550 2.182 1.479 2.655 1.576
Finance 1.218 2.306 0.939 1.968 0.890 1.442 0.509 1.491
Export 0.058 0.188 0.059 0.206 0.100 0.272 0.117 0.294
Innovation 0.095 0.246 0.038 0.162 0.020 0.118 0.024 0.131
Number of ﬁrms 1053 8982 12696 83986
5. Entrants during the last year of the data (i.e. 2005) are not considered because we have no post-entry
information on them. Of course we use 2005 data for previous entrants.
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precise, 76% of the latter survived during the sample period, whereas the
corresponding ﬁgures for ﬁrms aﬃliated with higher, middle and local level of
governments are 86%, 81% and 84% respectively. These ﬁgures do not of
course control for observable and unobservable characteristics aﬀecting ﬁrms’
survival prospects. For this we turn to the econometric estimates of the
proportional Cox hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity reported in
Table 3.
The importance of political aﬃliation for the survival prospects of ﬁrms
can be seen from the magnitude of the hazard ratio coeﬃcients given in the
Table 3
Political Aﬃliation and Firm Survival: HazardRatio Estimates fromCoxModel withUnobserved
Heterogeneity
COEFFICIENT All ﬁrms Labour intensive Capital intensive
High level of government aﬃliation 0.626 0.917 0.503
(2 2.69) (2 2.30) (2 3.08)
Middle level of government aﬃliation 0.709 0.691 0.699
(2 5.81) (2 3.96) (2 4.30)
Local government aﬃliation 0.635 0.659 0.603
(2 6.54) (2 4.80) (2 4.49)
Productivity 0.899 0.903 0.895
(2 5.90) (2 4.24) (2 4.10)
Size 0.774 0.776 0.770
(2 37.2) (2 28.1) (2 24.5)
Age 1.026 1.027 1.025
(6.65) (5.15) (4.22)
Finance 0.990 0.987 0.995
(2 2.82) (2 2.93) (2 0.91)
Export 0.620 0.607 0.647
(2 20.7) (2 17.8) (2 10.8)
Innovation 0.507 0.534 0.490
(2 12.7) (2 7.34) (2 10.4)
Industry concentration 1.044 0.913 1.138
(2.69) (2 0.95) (2.58)
Industry entry rate 0.919 0.975 0.795
(2 0.56) (2 0.13) (2 0.90)
Industry exit rate 4.028 3.089 6.633
(8.05) (5.36) (6.19)
Observations 175648 102210 73438
Notes:
a. Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses.
b. signiﬁcant at 10%; signiﬁcant at 5%; signiﬁcant at 1%.
c. All speciﬁcations include time, sectoral and regional dummies.
d. Note that the coeﬃcients in the above table give hazard ratio. Hence a coeﬃcients greater (less)
thanone implies a higher (lower) hazard rate. For example, the hazard ratio of 0.659on ‘‘Local level’’
in the second column of Table 3 suggests that a private ﬁrm that is politically aﬃliated with local
governments have a 34.1% less hazard of exit than an otherwise equivalent ﬁrm with no political
aﬃliation.
e. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period.
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second column of Table 3. A ﬁrm that is aﬃliated with a high level of
government (i.e. central and provincial) faces a hazard rate that is only
62.6% of the hazard faced by a ﬁrmwithout political association. The beneﬁts
due to aﬃliationswith local andmiddle level governments are also positive and
economically signiﬁcant. Figure 1 shows the estimated hazard lines by level of
political connections, and it is evident that ﬁrms without political aﬃliation
face higher probability of exit. The results indicate an inverted-U shaped
relationship between the level of government aﬃliation and its impact on ﬁrm
survival. This is depicted in Figure 1, which also shows that this inverted U-
shaped relationship persists over time. Start-ups associatedwith higher level of
governments beneﬁt the most, followed by those aﬃliated with local govern-
ments, with middle level governments conferring the least advantage on their
prote´ge´es. This is in linewith the conjecture discussed inSection2. Incidentally,
the four curves in Figure 1 appear to be parallel, suggesting that the
proportionality assumptionunderlying theCoxhazardmodel is quiteplausible
in our context.
Reassuringly, the coeﬃcients on the control variables of the hazard model
are broadly consistent with expectations: larger, more productive and innova-
tive ﬁrms enjoy higher survival probabilities and ﬁrms in highly concentrated
Note: The vertical axis indicates the probability of firm exit 
 at time t conditional on surviving up to time t-1.
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Hazard function by level of political aﬃliation
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industries face higher likelihood of exit. Also export activity and access to
external ﬁnance enhances ﬁrms’ survival probability.
It iswell-established in theﬁnance literaturediﬀerent sectors are likely to face
diﬀerent external ﬁnancing requirements due to their technological diﬀerences
(RajanandZingales, 1998).Given thatoneof presumedmotivation for seeking
political aﬃliation is related to access to bank ﬁnance, we will explore whether
the beneﬁts or otherwise political aﬃliation vary across labour and capital
intensive sectors6. It is interesting to note that the survival eﬀects of political
aﬃliations are more pronounced in capital-intensive industries. In a labour-
abundant country like China, the ‘‘helping hand’’ of governments appears to
bemore eﬀective in sectors where access to capital is relativelymore important.
It is a stylised fact thatnewentrants are exposed tohigh riskof exit, especially
in the ﬁrst post-entry year. As Geroski (1995) put it, ‘‘the most palpable
consequence of entry is exit’’. Inﬂuential theoretical models such as Jovanovic
(1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) predict that ﬁrms’ growth and survival
performance depend on expectations about their own eﬃciency and the
uncertainty associated with this expectation. Having entered the market with
some prior belief about their performance, start-ups continuously update this
belief based on their observed post-entry eﬃciency. Depending on their
updated knowledge and the level of uncertainty they face, economically
rational ﬁrms decide whether to grow, decline or exit the market. In light of
this discussion, a plausible channel through which higher levels of political
connections may help enhance ﬁrms’ survival prospects is by reducing the
uncertainty regarding the future.
Firm growth and political behaviour
Table 4 reports theGMMestimates from the ﬁrm employment growthmodel.
In line with the results from the survival regressions, we uncover evidence that
political aﬃliation with higher levels of government is most beneﬁcial for the
post-entry growth of start-ups. Controlling for a host of variables aﬀecting
employment growth,we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in capital (labour) intensive sectors that
are aﬃliated with higher level of governments grow 5.81 (3.53) percentage
points faster than politically neutral ﬁrms. On average, this translates into 8
additional jobs per ﬁrm and per year than would otherwise be the case.
Aﬃliation with local governments also confers marked advantage on ﬁrm
growth. By contrast, the growth beneﬁts associated with middle level of
governments fall short of statistical signiﬁcance.
Thisﬁndingofpositive correlationbetweenpolitical behaviour and start-ups
growth is consistent with theoreticalmodels that postulate internal uncertainty
6. OECD’s classiﬁcation of labour and technology-intensive sectors is used in the analysis.
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as a key driver of ﬁrmgrowth.Firms that receive political protection andall the
attendant beneﬁts in termsof access to resources get positive signals about their
future prospects and grow larger as a result. On the other hand, because of
greater uncertainty regarding their future, it takes longer for start-ups without
political masters to determine their optimal ﬁrm size. Consequently, their
post-entry growth rate tends to be lower than that of otherwise similar ‘‘red
hat’’ ﬁrms.
We also ﬁnd that conditional on survival, smaller ﬁrms tend to grow faster,
suggesting convergence in ﬁrm size. Exporting intensity, access to ﬁnance and
innovation all have a positive impact on employment growth. In contrast,
higher product market concentration and ﬁrm age have adverse eﬀects on
growth.
Does the productivity of politically aﬃliated ﬁrms grow faster?
Table 4 also reports estimates from the productivity growth model. The most
striking ﬁnding is that, conditional on survival and a number of control
covariates, private ﬁrms without political aﬃliations exhibit higher productiv-
ity growth than ﬁrms with political connections. The total factor productivity
growth of start-ups aﬃliated with higher (middle) level governments is, on
average, 4.9 (2.7) percentage points lower than ‘‘pure’’ private ﬁrms. It is also
interesting to note that the productivity growth diﬀerential between start-ups
with and without political behaviour is smallest for ﬁrms aﬃliated with local
governments. In other words, amongst politically connected ﬁrms, those
aﬃliated to local government enjoy the highest productivity growth. This is
consistent with the notion that China’s system of ﬁscal federalism has been
more successful in aligning local business interests with those of local govern-
ment. Alternatively, this ﬁnding can also be explained by the fact that local
governments have fewer ﬁrms per head under their protection, and might as a
result be able to provide eﬀective assistance conducive to eﬃciency improve-
ment. A ﬁnal explanation could be that since local governments’ bureaucrats
are subject to less frequent rotations thanprovincial orprefectureoﬃcials, their
decision making process is subject to less acute time inconsistency problem
(Huang, 2003).
To summarise, the results reported in this section provides fresh ﬁrm level
evidence on the economic impact of political aﬃliation. Previous papers have
focused on the ﬁnancing strategy (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), stock
market performance (Fisman, 2001 and Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and
proﬁtability (Li et al., 2008) of politically connected ﬁrms. By contrast, our
work concentrates on the survival and growth of start-up ﬁrms and thus
complements existing studies and contributes to a fuller understanding of the
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economic impact of government-ﬁrm relationships. Furthermore by using a
large and more representative sample, we are able to identify more complex
eﬀects of political connections than has been possible thus far.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper sought to understand the role of political connections on the post-
entryperformanceofprivate start-up companies inChina. It documents robust
evidence that political connections enhance ﬁrms’ growth and survival
prospects, even if politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster eﬃciency improve-
ments. So more than a quarter of a century after Deng Xiaoping’s famous
pronouncement that the colour of the cat does not matter as long as it catches
mice, it seems that the cat in a redhat is somewhatmore privileged than the one
without.
Assessing the aggregate ramiﬁcations of political cronyism in China
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in view of our ﬁnding that
private ﬁrms with no political ties tend to exhibit faster productivity
growth and yet are more likely to exit the market, it is safe to conjecture that
the close association between the state and a segment of the business
community is leading to sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy by
interfering with the process of market selection. Growing calls for a level
playing ﬁeld are likely to be heard in the future, though almost certainly not
from the red capitalists who appear to thrive in the current political economic
milieu.
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SUMMARY
Using a unique ﬁrm level data, this paper analyses the role of political connections in the post-entry
performanceofprivate start-up companies inChina. It documents robust evidence thatpolitical aﬃliation
enhances ﬁrms’ survival and growth prospects. But interestingly politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster
productivity improvements conditional on survival. In addition, the beneﬁts of political connections are
largely conﬁned to ﬁrms associated with local or top level governments, and they are more pronounced in
capital-intensive industries.We conclude that the close association between the state and a segment of the
business community is leading to sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy by interfering with the
process of market selection.
r 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 545
RED CAPITALISTS
